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Sporting Knowledge 
 
Gunnar Breivik 
 
Introduction 
The problem of knowledge has been discussed in philosophy since Early Greek 
philosophy.  Central problems were raised by Plato and Aristotle that have been at the core of 
epistemology as one of the central philosophical disciplines.  The goal of the Greek 
philosophers was to secure timeless truths - episteme – as opposed to mere opinions among 
people – doxa.  Skepticism was a serious challenge in Greek philosophy as well as modern 
philosophy.  René Descartes’ basic aim was to secure true knowledge that could withstand 
skepticism.  The rationalists (Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Baruch Spinoza) and empiricists 
(John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume) discussed whether perception or thinking could 
best provide true knowledge.  Also in present-day discussions in epistemology one of the 
most important tasks is to defend knowledge against the threat of skepticism.1 
The discussion of knowledge in epistemology takes knowledge in a narrow sense, 
mostly centered around problems relating to theoretical or propositional knowledge.  
However, Aristotle discussed praxis and techne as knowledge forms.  The practical 
knowledge of politics and the technical knowledge displayed in art and handicraft are 
different from theoretical knowledge.  In modern philosophy, the practical knowledge forms 
have received more attention.  The discussion of “knowing how” versus “knowing that” in 
analytic philosophy, as well as the discussion of various forms of practical knowledge in 
phenomenology, have widened the perspective of knowledge and introduced a broader 
conceptualization. 
Sport is a practical activity and it is no surprise that the discussion of theoretical 
epistemological problems has received little attention in sport.  Sporting knowledge is, 
however, strongly related to practical knowledge, to the discussion of know how, learning, 
and skill.  Therefore, this essay will deal mostly with the various forms of practical 
knowledge displayed in sports.  However, with the strong development of sport sciences 
since the 1970s, the discussion of theoretical knowledge has become more important to sport 
philosophers, mostly as a “philosophy of sport sciences.” In this essay, I will therefore start 
with a short discussion of the development of sport sciences and then go into the more 
specific problems relating to practical sporting knowledge. 
 
Conceptual Clarification 
Epistemology can be defined as “the study of the nature of knowledge and 
justification; specifically the study of a) the defining features, b) the substantive conditions, 
and c) the limits of knowledge and justification.”2  This general definition allows for different  
kinds of knowledge.  Propositional knowledge states that something is so and so.  This type 
of knowledge may be empirical (a posteriori) or logical and mathematical (a priori) 
knowledge.  Philosophers also mostly accept knowledge that is non-propositional, like 
knowledge by acquaintance or by direct awareness.  Some philosophers, like Robert Audi, 
distinguish between knowledge de dicto, about propositions and facts, and knowledge de re, 
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about objects and their properties.3  In addition, an important form of knowledge is self-
knowledge or knowledge de se.  A special kind of knowledge, which is important in sport, is 
knowledge of how to do something.4 
This means that as a sportsperson I have direct knowledge of myself, who I am, my 
abilities and so on (knowledge de se).  Furthermore, I know how to do things in my sport, I 
have certain sporting skills (know how).  I also have direct knowledge of my sports 
equipment (knowledge de re).  I also have direct knowledge of fellow athletes (knowledge by 
acquaintance).  I also know things about my sport, how it developed, its rules, and so on 
(propositional knowledge).  I also have a lot of experience, both episodic memories of past 
events and experiences that predisposes me to behave in certain ways in different situations.  
As we will see later, a sportsperson also has a lot of background knowledge that lets him or 
her find meaning and behave in relevant ways in different situations.  If one looks at sports 
today, especially at higher level of sports, one finds a lot of knowledge developed by 
scientific research and, not to forget, thousands of hours of experience, accumulated by 
athletes, their coaches, leaders, service people, team doctors, and so on. 
Sporting knowledge is thus diverse and of many kinds.  Some of the knowledge is 
explicit, but much is implicit or tacit. In what follows, I will not be able to cover the whole 
domain of sporting knowledge, so I have selected some of the most relevant topics and 
issues.  Since sport is a practical bodily activity, it is reasonable that the main focus be 
practical knowledge   
 
A) Theoretical Knowledge 
The Development of Sport Scientific Knowledge 
According to John Massengale and Richard Swanson,5 the various sport scientific 
sub-disciplines had their origins towards the end of the nineteenth century, their first 
organizational events took place after World War II, and the development of the specific sub-
disciplines with their international organizations finally happened in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  During the 1960s, many sport scientific sub-disciplines were developed and gained 
some independence and identity in relation to their mother disciplines (sport psychology, 
sport sociology, exercise and sport physiology, and so on).  At the Pre-Olympic Scientific 
Congress before the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 the German philosopher Hans Lenk 
gave a presentation on the philosophy of sport as a field of study 6 and described the quite 
different philosophical interpretations of sport by philosophers, authors, and commentators.  
Shortly after the Munich conference, The Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport was 
founded in the United States in 1973 and the first scholarly sport philosophy journal, Journal 
of Philosophy of Sport, appeared that same year. 
From the 1970s onward, sports sciences developed differently in different countries.  
In some countries they were organized as a specialty or a sub-discipline of a mother 
discipline.  In other countries specific sport scientific schools were set up, educating people to 
various professions, like sport manager, sport psychologist, sports coach, outdoor life 
instructor, physical education teacher, researcher, fitness instructor, and so on. 
As sport sciences were developed in teaching as well as research, at colleges and 
universities in various countries in the 1980s, the need for clear paradigms and organizational 
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efficiency became pressing.  In this regard, Karl Newell made an important distinction 
between two fundamental types of knowledge, called “declarative” and “procedural.”7  
Declarative knowledge encompasses theoretical knowledge related to activity-cognate sub-
disciplines, but also to practitioner knowledge, which “is associated with the role of a specific 
professional activity (such as teaching, coaching, etc.) and might be viewed generally as 
practical competence.”8  Procedural knowledge is related to what one can execute as a 
practical act or behavior.  We will come back to this type of knowledge later. 
The search for relevant paradigms also included efforts to counteract the increasing 
split between different sub-disciplines and the separation of theory and practice.  Roland 
Renson discussed various models in the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, and 
the Low Countries, and suggested an integrated model for the “Study of Man in Movement.”9  
Renson’s idea was to include sport, play, work, and exercise into the new integrated science 
of kinanthropology and distinguished between several cross-disciplinary areas like 
developmental, differential, social-cultural, clinical, and agogical approaches and connected 
this with a practice-based or professional application.  Since these efforts in the early 1990s, 
it seems that the sport-related programs at university level have developed in different 
directions.  In some countries many practice and skill-based knowledge areas have been 
outsourced to practical experts.  Activity-related research has since then lost its academic 
foundation. 
In general science as well as in sport sciences, the standard account of knowledge has 
been the model developed in relation to the most advanced natural sciences, like physics.  In 
the standard account knowledge is defined as “justified true belief.” It holds, according to 
Jonathan Dancy, that “a knows that p if and only if 1) p, 2) a believes that p, 3) a’s belief that 
p is justified.”10  During the nineteenth century, the goal of the natural science was to 
establish true objective knowledge by verification of eternal causal laws.  In the twentieth 
century Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and others contributed to more contextual 
views of science and accepted the differences between natural sciences, social sciences, and 
humanities.  Parallel developments in philosophy, epistemology, and theory of science led to 
views amenable to relativism, constructivism, and even deconstructive theories.11  We see the 
results of this development in two recent books that show that philosophy of science has now 
entered the philosophic discussion of sport.  In Philosophy and the Sciences of Exercise, 
Health and Sport, edited by Mike McNamee, scholars from various disciplines and fields of 
study discuss problems in philosophy of science in relation to sport.12   
The most encompassing discussion of philosophy of science in relation to sport 
sciences has been presented by Graham McFee in his book Ethics, Knowledge and Truth in 
Sports Research.13  It deserves a short discussion.  McFee’s book has a special focus on 
social sciences and humanities.  He rejects “an ahistorical and universal ‘one right answer’ 
conception of truth which drives many scientistic misconceptions concerning research into 
human situations, including setting inappropriate goals for social science.”14 McFee discards 
both scientism and postmodernism and instead, inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein, he 
develops contextualism as his position.  From a contextualist perspective, the search for truth 
is meaningful, but only relative to a certain social and historical context.  For instance, 
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scoring a goal in football is only meaningful relative to a context where football is developed 
in a certain way to make the scoring of goals meaningful and true. 
For McFee, explanation in social sciences and humanities takes the form of 
intentional explanations: “The intentional explanation of an event depends on how the event 
is appropriately characterized (and such like) by its agent.”15  Therefore the “world” of social 
sciences is not determined by exceptionless laws and strict causality, where one can predict 
future events on the basis of these laws.  Whereas in natural sciences one can set up a finite 
set of causal factors to explain what happened, such a thing is impossible in social sciences.  
McFee’s position leads to a form of naturalism, which means that persons must be studied in 
natural contexts.  More important than a distinction between qualitative and qualitative 
methods is a distinction between those who take people seriously as research subjects and 
those who do not. 
 
B) Practical Knowledge 
Sport Philosophy and Knowledge: the Beginnings 
The connection between sport and knowledge has a background in Greek ideas.  In 
the incipient sport philosophy of the 1970s it was raised again by several authors. 
In his article, “A fine forehand,” Paul Ziff raised some questions that Margaret Steel 
and Spencer Wertz later developed and tried to answer.16  Ziff asked us to imagine a coach 
that tells a tennis player that he is not bending enough his knees when hitting the forehand.  
In many cases, athletes seem not to be aware of, or not know precisely, their bodily position 
and where their limbs are.  How is it with this “knowledge without observation”?  How do 
players manage to remember the positions of their body? 
Steel went directly into the problem of what is happening when we learn a new 
sport.17  She distinguished between “inductive learning” and “learning by exemplars.” She 
discarded the inductive model because it is unable to analyze the totality of a technique.  
Instead she used Kuhn’s idea of paradigms and maintained that we learn a sport in a similar 
way as we learn a paradigm in science.  In order to learn a science, one must identify the 
specific science and its disciplinary matrix, and one must be presented with an exemplar of 
the practice of such science.  Similarly, to learn a sport one needs to learn what the sport is 
about, its paradigmatic totality, and what it means to take part in the sport.  There is, 
therefore, a distinction between the specific movements, skills, and techniques that one must 
learn and the totality of a performance as an instance of that sport.  During the process, the 
learner must be guided by “gestalts” presented by the instructor or other sportspersons as role 
models.  Accordingly, “sports and games are acquired by demonstration, and not by teaching 
in the sense of being told.”18  In contrast to science, knowledge in sport is not knowledge of 
facts but rather of gestalts and processes. 
Wertz followed up on the questions posed by Ziff and Steel.19 Wertz distinguished 
between two theories about knowledge in sport.  The “result theory” is used when players 
only look at whether they succeed in what they aim to do. The other theory is called the “feel 
theory.”  Here the focus is on the feeling one has when executing a movement.  Some athletes 
try to memorize this feeling in order to succeed over time.  Wertz refers to Timothy Gallwey 
and examples from good tennis players who focus on feeling rather than result.  But this 
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feeling is not an inner feeling.  It is not like, say, the feeling of confidence.  It is the feeling of 
a bodily movement.  There is, thus, a difference between an emotional feeling and a bodily 
feeling.  The bodily feeling, in turn, can be a perceptual feeling or a feeling as a sensation.  In 
contrast to the more specific sensation, say in one’s hand, the perceptual feeling is a totality, a 
gestalt.  Wertz here followed Steel and the idea of a paradigmatic learning by exemplars.  He 
called this “the skill model.” 
Ziff, Steel, and Wertz in various ways brought the practitioner into view and looked at 
how we come to know a sport and become proficient in it.  R.  Scott Kretchmar then brought 
a new twist to the discussion.20 He argued that, instead of being absorbed in concrete 
involvement, “athletes commonly achieve a uniquely human distance from their sport 
environment by reason of abstract thinking engaged in by these performers during play.”21  
According to Kretchmar, human behavior is characterized by intentional activity where we 
can distance ourselves from the immediate surroundings and focus on certain objects, goals, 
or things to do, and thereby open up a space of possibilities for thinking and action.  This 
opening up of possibilities is developed on the background of absorption.  Thus “there is 
nothing inherently incompatible between spontaneous, ‘thought-less’ play and distancing.”22  
Kretchmar builds on Martin Buber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi, and 
discusses especially how athletes receive “multiple invitations to act” and how distancing 
makes possible the most relevant and most functional choices, among these invitations.  
Kretchmar seems to argue for a form of “thinking” in sports practices, which is of its own 
kind.  “Distancing, it was shown, does not necessarily produce knowledge.  Nor does it 
inherently beg for the use of language.  The ‘medium of exchange’ in sport is ‘feel’, and 
meaningful distinctions in this realm typically outrun any verbal ability to refer to them.”23  
Accordingly, Kretchmar maintains that athletes have their own “brand of thinking.”  It is 
obvious that this thinking does not result in knowledge of the common kind.  It rather seems 
to be a sort of thinking in doing or thinking in playing. 
 
“Knowing that” and “Knowing How”: Gilbert Ryle as Sport Philosopher 
The sport philosophy authors of the 1970s who wrote about knowledge in sport 
already had access to the works of Ryle and Polanyi.  In his book The Concept of Mind, Ryle 
made the important distinction between knowing how and knowing that.24  His point of 
departure is ordinary life.  Whereas science and philosophy typically discuss the nature, 
source, and credentials of theories, in ordinary life “we are much more concerned with 
people’s competencies than with their cognitive repertoires.”25  When we describe people as 
knowing how to do something, we normally imply that they perform well, that they perform 
correctly or efficiently.  According to what Ryle called the intellectualist legend, knowing 
how could be assimilated to knowing that “by arguing that intelligent performance involves 
the observance of rules, or the application of criteria.”26  This means that an agent first has to 
go through an inner mental operation producing maxims or rules for what to do and then 
apply these rules in the execution of the performance.  Ryle criticizes this view by 
maintaining that many performances, for instance jokes, show intelligence but no rules.  
More importantly, the idea of inner operations in accordance with rules would lead to an 
endless regress since in order to perform the inner operation correctly one would need new 
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rules in order to perform the inner operation right.  Therefore, Ryle concludes that “Efficient 
practice precedes the theory of it; methodologies presuppose the application of methods.” 27 
To perform something intelligently, thus, does not mean first to consider rules or 
prescriptions and then execute it according to the rules.  Ryle gives the example of learning to 
play chess where a novice would gradually, with the help of an instructor, learn the rules and 
become skilled.  He might then play without being aware of the rules or think about them at 
all.  “At this stage he might even have lost his former ability to cite the rules.  If asked to 
instruct another beginner, he might have forgotten how to state the rules and he would show 
the beginner how to play only by himself making the correct moves and cancelling the 
beginner’s false moves.”28  This means that a person’s ability to play chess is verified by his 
playing chess and not by hidden operations in his or her head or whether he is able to 
describe the rules.  Ryle does not deny that one can have inner thoughts, inner operations of 
the mind, but he maintains that the inner operation has its own success criteria. 
Ryle also makes a distinction between habit and intelligent practice.  “It is of the 
essence of merely habitual practices that one performance is a replica of its predecessors.  It 
is of the essence of intelligent practices that one performance is modified by its predecessors.  
The agent is learning.”29  This is typical for elite sport since athletes are all the time trying to 
optimize their performance in contrast to daily life where satisficing, showing acceptable 
performance, is good enough to get by. 
Another important distinction is between theory and practice.  “A man knowing little 
or nothing of medical science could not be a good surgeon, but excellence at surgery is not 
the same thing as knowledge of medical science; nor is it the product of it.”30  The surgeon 
must have learned by theory and by practice.  One may be good at practicing but bad at 
theorizing and vice versa. 
Both knowing how and knowing that come from learning, but not in the same way.  
“Learning how or improving in ability is not like learning that or acquiring information.  
Truths can be imparted, procedures can only be inculcated, and while inculcation is a gradual 
process, imparting is relatively sudden.  It makes sense to ask at what moment someone 
became apprised of a truth, but not to ask at what moment someone acquired a skill.”31  To 
have a skill or be skilled is thus to have acquired a stable disposition to perform an act at a 
certain level.  To be skilled admits of grades, but normally higher levels are implied. 
 
Polanyi - Personal Knowledge 
After Ryle had made the distinction between knowing how and knowing that, Polanyi 
introduced the distinction between personal or tacit knowledge as opposed to objective or 
scientific knowledge.  Polanyi criticized the traditional objective view of knowledge and 
maintained that even in the natural sciences there is a “personal participation of the knower in 
all acts of understanding.”32  According to Polanyi, this does not make science subjective, but 
it means that the subject relates to the objective world with passion, interest, and the 
indeterminacy and probabilities that such a relation entails.  It is, however, on the personal 
knowledge that is displayed in the practice of skills that Polanyi makes a lasting contribution. 
Polanyi introduces the idea of unconscious rules that has been much discussed 
recently.  He maintains that “the aim of skillful performance is achieved by the observance of 
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rules which are not known as such to the person who is following them.”33  For instance, the 
swimmer adheres to the rules and laws of nature that must be followed if one wants to keep 
oneself afloat and move forward through the water.  Even more well-known is the example of 
cycling, used by Peter Hopsicker and others.  According to Polanyi, cyclists observe rules 
unknown to themselves.  “When he starts falling to the right he turns the handlebars to the 
right, so that the course of the bicycle is deflected along a curve towards the right.”34  But this 
kind of rule is different from a rule that can be obtained by a biomechanical analysis, like “for 
a given angle of imbalance the curvature of each winding is inversely proportional to the 
square of the speed at which the cyclist is proceeding.”35 The cyclist does not know this last 
analysis or at least does not follow the result of the analysis.  Biomechanical analysis can be 
useful but it does not determine how to execute the act of bicycling.  The biomechanical 
analysis can at best be integrated with the practice. 
Especially relevant for the discussion of performance in sports is Polanyi’s distinction  
between two types of awareness: “When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to 
both nail and hammer, but in a different way.  We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail 
and try to wield the hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively.”  By executing the stroke “I 
have a subsidiary awareness of the feeling in the palm of my hand which is merged into my 
focal awareness of my driving in the nail.”36  The feeling in the palm of the hand is 
subsidiary and thus instrumental in bringing about what the person focuses on and aims at.  
There is thus a from-to movement of one’s awareness, away from the subsidiary to the focal.  
Polanyi then extends this distinction to the relation between the body and the surrounding 
world.  The hammer or the blind person’s stick is an extension of the body and it may be 
experienced as parts of the body.  Polanyi says that “We pour ourselves out into them and 
assimilate them as parts of our own existence.  We accept them existentially by dwelling in 
them.”37  But Polanyi later adds that through this process we render these instruments 
unconscious.  We become unconscious of how we use a racket in tennis.  But we become 
conscious of the target.  Thus, we have three factors operating: the knower, the focal targets, 
and the subsidiary particulars.  Polanyi calls it dwelling when the knower has a tacit 
awareness of the subsidiaries and a focus on the target or purpose of the movement.  If there 
is a focus on subsidiaries the performance breaks down, which happens, for example, when a 
pianist starts watching his fingers. 
But dwelling is not enough.  “Moving to higher levels of skillful performance requires 
one to move beyond dwelling within the triad of subsidiary awareness, focal targets, and 
personal integration.  A conscious effort is needed to acquire knowledge and skillfully apply 
it.”38  In order to reach higher performance levels, one needs goal-directed striving by a 
combination of intuition, imagination, and ideas.  “Through intentional striving by 
performers, the imagination actively casts forth potential ideas and solutions to confronted 
challenges.  This latter mechanism is catalyzed through one’s intuition which spontaneously 
integrates subsidiaries to create explicit solutions.39  Thus, Polanyi has a room for tacit 
immediate absorption as well as creative imagination and conscious striving.   
 
A Combination of Knowing How and Knowing That?  Sigmund Loland and the Example of 
Alpine Skiing 
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The knowing that perspective uses theoretical knowledge to explain sport 
performance, whereas personal knowing how may help explain to the athlete why some 
performances succeed or fail.  Can both types of knowledge be combined?  Loland has 
presented an example of a possible combination with a demonstration from alpine skiing.40 
Alpine skiers have personal “inner” experiences but their performance can also be 
analyzed from “the outside,” by coaches with video cameras.  Loland asks us to “Imagine 
watching a skilled skier carving round, harmonious turns down a steep mountainside.”41  The 
skier demonstrates good skiing technique.  According to Loland, there are two alternative 
approaches to understand movements of this kind: an analytic approach and a holistic 
approach.  The analytic approach is the one of natural science with its claim to objective 
knowledge.  The other is the holistic approach, which makes reference to the subjective 
experience of the skier.  In contrast to the meristic view of analytic science, where a whole is 
just the sum of its parts, the whole in the holistic approach is a gestalt, which is more than the 
sum of its parts.  In contrast to the theoretical mechanical laws of natural science, 
phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Hubert Dreyfus are better equipped to give a 
description of the “know how” of the skilled skier.  But the holistic view also has its 
limitations, according to Loland, since holists are not able to present theories that are open to 
empirical testing and other requirements of traditional scientific methodology.  Holistic 
findings, therefore, need to be discussed and defended on the basis of rational arguments.  
One could think that the two approaches complement each other or are able to be integrated 
into a broader framework.  Instead, Loland presents them as alternative positions with distinct  
methodologies inside what he calls an open possibilist framework. 
 
C) Phenomenological Knowledge 
Martin Heidegger and Knowledge 
In addition to Ryle and other analytical approaches to knowing how, many 
philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have discussed the problem of knowledge in 
relation to practical activities like sports.  A recent book, Phenomenological Approaches to 
Sport, edited by Irena Martínková and Jim Parry, shows the many new approaches to sport 
philosophy coming from phenomenology.42  The works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
have many implications for sporting knowledge. 
Husserl is the founder of phenomenology.43  Husserl wanted to develop an exact 
science where the goal was to give a precise description of the essential structures (das 
Wesen) of the phenomena that showed themselves to the subject.  The phenomenological 
description was obtained by moving away from the empirical reality and the individual 
variations of phenomena, and concentrating only on the essences (eidetic reduction) 
presenting themselves to the intentional subject.  Instead of causal explanations, 
phenomenologists wanted to give precise descriptions of phenomena, of their relations and 
meaning. 
Building on Husserl, Heidegger wanted to describe the basic structures of human 
existence, since the human being is the entry point to an understanding of the world as such.  
Knowledge, whatever it is about, is always human knowledge and not God’s knowledge or 
animal knowledge. 
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Heidegger defined the human mode of being (Dasein) as being-in-the-world, thereby 
indicating the strong bond between humans and the environing world.44  Heidegger’s goal in 
his early philosophy was to reach an understanding of the basic ontological structures of the 
human being-in-the-world.  One of these basic structures is understanding (Verstehen), since 
humans always already have an understanding of their situation in the world.  The 
understanding is directed towards the future, since the goal is to take care of oneself in 
relation to what comes.  By looking into the future, being aware of the past, and relating to 
the present, the human being carries his or her life project towards death.  Heidegger shows 
how the understanding is linked to human existence and thus defined by deep interests.  We 
can call this knowledge a basic existential knowledge since it means that we understand our 
own existence in the world as “being towards death.”  According to Heidegger, one can hide 
from this insight and live like all the others do in their everyday existence, or live 
authentically, facing death and realizing one’s deepest possibilities. 
According to Heidegger there are two other forms of knowledge, one theoretical and 
the other practical.  Whereas theoretical knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, has 
a high prestige in modern society, this type of knowledge is, according to Heidegger, not the 
primary one.  Our primary mode of understanding the world is not to describe the things as 
objects but to use them as equipment.  Most of the time entities in the world are discovered in 
their functionality, which is taken in a very wide sense by Heidegger.  “In our dealings we 
come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement.”45  That 
which makes things suitable for such uses is what he called “equipmentality” 
(Zeughaftigkeit).  The carpenter thus has a practical grip on the world.  A hammer is a piece 
of equipment, it is used in an equipmental context of hammer, nails, planks, walls, house, etc.  
To describe the hammer as an object with a certain form, weight, color, and so on, is a 
secondary way of relating to it.  According to Heidegger, we have then at least three forms of 
knowledge: existential knowledge, practical knowledge, and theoretical knowledge. 
Heidegger’s idea of being-in-the-world means that humans have an immediate 
understanding of the environment that is being developed early in childhood and onwards.  
Play in children gives the brain models that answer questions like “what can I do?” or “what 
is possible?”  This bodily relation to the environing world is explored in extreme forms in 
some sports.  Building on Heidegger, Breivik studied how climbers explore vertical cliff, sky 
divers play with wind resistance in empty space, and kayakers dance with, and on, the waves 
of white water.46 Dangerous play with the elements presupposes a knowledge of “what I can 
do” and of “how I can do it” in relation to specific natural elements.  Based on long 
experience, some people simply understand water and how it behaves, how air resistance 
builds up in free-fall, and how hard rock allows for finger holds and grips. 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Bodily Knowledge 
Heidegger described very well the practical human being, but in his theory the human 
body was not clearly visible and remained in the background.  The hand that held the 
hammer, the arm and body that directed, and gave momentum to the hand, disappeared.  And 
it was not clear how the existential knowledge of being-in-the-world included the body.  This 
was corrected by Merleau-Ponty, who showed convincingly how the human body is not only 
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a body-object but a body-subject.47 It is through the active body as a medium, that we relate to 
the world and immediately know how to behave and handle tools. 
Merleau-Ponty underlined the intentionality of the body.  Central for Merleau-Ponty 
is that “my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible 
task.”48  This intentionality of the body is a form of knowledge that, according to Breivik, is 
exemplified in many ways on the sporting field.49  For instance, the movements and positions 
of football players on the field are defined and solicited by the movements of the ball and the 
other players.  It is the situation that defines the body, its movements and positions.  And 
more than that, good football players are able to read the situation before the ball is played.  
Therefore, the best players tend to be at the right place at the right time.  And even more than 
that, they are ready for the action that the situation demands. 
Merleau Ponty speaks about what he calls the body as a motor power, a “motor 
project” or a “motor intentionality.”  This motor intentionality operates in various contexts as 
an optimizing agent.  We have an ability to find the right relations to sizes and distances in 
our environment.  “For each object, as for each picture in a gallery, there is an optimum 
distance from which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed from which it vouchsafes most 
of itself.”50  This involves a dynamic attitude.  Merleau-Ponty calls it “a tension which 
fluctuates round a norm.”51  He thinks that in general we come to grips with things by placing 
ourselves in them.  We break forth into them and in a sense transcend into them.  It is by 
establishing this bond that we can come to feel what the optimal grip is and explore the 
various perspectives of whatever we are dealing with. 
Merleau-Ponty gives several examples of this motor understanding of the world.  For 
instance, when driving a car one can see that one can get through an opening without having 
to compare the width of the opening with the outline of the car.  Through our bodies we thus 
have a knowledge about the world that is implicit and that makes it possible to move around 
efficiently.  Merleu-Ponty also distinguishes between body image and body scheme.  Body 
image is the passive view “from the outside” of how I look and behave.  Body scheme is the 
operative body experienced “from the inside” that makes me aware of “what I can do.”  Brian 
O’Shaughnessy further elaborates on this and notes that through our body scheme we know 
a) what is possible for me now, 2) what I can do at my best, 3) what is possible for experts.52 
This is very relevant in relation to sports.  It seems that as people reach higher performance 
levels, they get more precise understandings of what they can do now, at their best, and what 
the very best athletes can do. 
Building on the work of Samuel Todes, Breivik also underlines the importance of the 
basic bodily orientations in space.53  Humans always know whether they are balanced or not, 
where they are directed.  The vertical space with gravity forces limits our movement 
upwards, whereas the free 360 degree horizontal space opens up for movement in many 
directions.  Todes calls the intention of the active body its poise in dealing with things and 
distinguishes it sharply from the pose of the inactive body.54  As soon as I am poised, I know 
what I am doing and I know about the surrounding objects.  Poise is therefore both the 
internal coordination of the body and the skillful handling of things and persons around us. 
This fundamental bodily knowledge of how we are oriented in space and how we 
interact with the surroundings is mostly a form of tacit knowledge.  It is, as Heidegger 
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claimed, only in situations of “break-down,” where things do not function as expected, that 
we become aware of our normal well-balanced relations to the surrounding world. 
 
Hubert Dreyfus: Critique of Cognitivism and the Importance of Background Knowledge  
Dreyfus builds his philosophy on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty but develops 
phenomenology in his own direction.  Dreyfus’ book What Computers Can't Do: The Limits 
of Artificial Intelligence was first published in 1972.55  Here Dreyfus attacked the computer 
models of how the human mind works, arguing that the human mind is not a computer.  The 
mind does not relate to the brain as software to hardware.  Humans have capacities that 
computers lack, like elegant walking, telling jokes, building violins, expressing feelings, or 
making innovations.  The expert knowledge used by the best violin makers, like Antonio 
Stradivari and Andrea Guarneri, was tacit and intuitive.  For instance, the computer programs 
that are used by artificial intelligence experts are not able to catch the complexity and fine 
discriminations that are needed to select the right material to build a violin.  Dreyfus’s 
critique of cognitivism and computer models was followed up by Vegard Moe.56  He makes a 
strong critique of cognitivism and the information processing models that have dominated 
research in motor control and learning.  Moe’s key term is intentional movement.  His 
premise is that movements in sport are intentional actions.  Cognitivism instead assumes i) 
that athletes are processors of information, and ii) that intentional movement is set up in 
advance by one or several motor programs.”57  Moe maintains that, instead of relating to 
cognitive representations or executing motor programs, athletes deal with the surroundings 
directly in an absorbed and non-representational manner.  Sport is thus an extension of our 
daily dwelling in the world.  Movements in sport are intentionally directed at bringing about 
certain states and the way success is reached is a sign of how skilled the behavior is. 
In accordance with the phenomenological tradition, Dreyfus underlined the 
importance of experiential knowledge and how expertise is built on long and varied practice.  
Together with his brother, Dreyfus studied how airline pilots reached the highest performance 
level.  With input also from activities like chess and sport, the Dreyfus brothers developed a 
five stage skill model that showed how performers went from novice to expert level.  At the 
beginners level, practitioners learn by instruction and follow rules.  With more experience, 
they become able to make finer discriminations and act according to variations in context and 
situation.  At the expert level, practitioners perform with direct intuitive reactions to the 
relevant features of the situations without using rules, concepts, or mental representations of 
any kind.  Experts are characterized by “absorbed skillful coping.”  As we will see later, this 
model has been heavily debated by sport philosophers. 
In daily situations as well as in sport, Dreyfus underlines the importance of 
“background knowledge.”  The Gestalt theorists thought that a figure is impossible without a 
background.  Similarly intentions are made possible by various forms of knowledge, which 
has accumulated though a person’s life and which is dependent upon the experiences and 
kind of life the person has spent.  It is this complex and vast area of knowledge that is 
impossible to model in a computer program and that make computers unable to perform even 
seemingly simple daily life activities.  The situational and environmental background is 
lacking. 
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Dreyfus here got support from his philosophical adversary, but personal friend, John 
Searle, who from his analytic point of view underlined the importance of background 
knowledge in intentional actions.  Moe has shown how Searle and Dreyfus share some 
common viewpoints and how they differed in others.  According to Searle an intentional state 
is related to other intentional states in a “Network” and is dependent upon a certain 
“Background”. According to Moe’s interpretation of Searle “the Background is a set of 
“nonrepresentational” or “preintentional” “mental capacities” that provides the preconditions 
for intentional states.” 58  The idea is that “what one simply takes for granted fits into the 
Background, and the things we learn through consciously acquired rules and facts, fit into the 
Network.”59  Whereas Dreyfus placed the background knowledge “out there” in the 
environment, Searle in his later views understood the Network and the Background as 
“neurophysiological brain capacities.”  Searle’s neurophysiological and causal approach to 
background capacities is therefore quite different from Dreyfus’ fundamental ontology and 
hermeneutic of everydayness. 
 
Phenomenal Knowledge 
According to Dreyfus, people performing at expert level are totally absorbed in what 
they are doing.  The performance is non-conscious and non-representational.  As Breivik has 
maintained, Dreyfus’ view almost makes elite athletes look like zombies.60  As a 
consequence of this, the knowledge they have must be implicit or tacit.  But is this the whole 
story? 
In a famous article, Thomas Nagel maintained that only a bat can have an experience of 
“what it is like to be a bat.”61  This experience has a qualitative feel, called qualia.  Alan 
Chalmers then introduced the distinction between two forms of consciousness.  Whereas 
phenomenal consciousness is characterized by the experience of qualia, the feeling of what it 
is like to be in a certain way, psychological consciousness is the mental machinery that makes 
us perceive, decide, and act.  As Chalmers says: “On the phenomenal concept, mind is 
characterized by what it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it 
does.”62  This opens up for two types of knowledge.  The question is whether phenomenal 
consciousness is unique and whether it generates knowledge that is different from knowledge 
obtained from psychological consciousness.  I may drive my car to work and be completely 
absentminded, thinking about other things than driving and not being aware of traffic lights 
and what I have been doing.  Obviously, the psychological consciousness, the mental 
machinery, is working.  But what is lost when I do not attend to what I am doing? The 
question is related to the famous article by Frank Jackson, “What Mary Did Not Know.”63  
Mary is color blind but has learned everything that there is to know about colors.  Is there 
anything that she has lost, from a knowledge point of view? Breivik argues that something is 
lost.  Using examples from elite sport, Breivik maintains that elite athletes are consciously 
monitoring and correcting what they are doing based on conscious experience of what is 
happening.64  Elite downhill skier Aksel Lund Svindal consciously experiences deviations 
from the optimal course in his downhill run and corrects his position.  Michael Johnson 
consciously attends to his running and immediately corrects the next steps based on what just 
happened. 
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Following Breivik, Jens Birch argues that specific sport experiences include specific 
qualitative states, specific phenomenal experiences.  “These features make the experience of 
outdoor rock climbing unidentical to the indoor plastic climbing, even though the attention 
mechanisms and the mere movements might be identical.  Phenomenal consciousness is not 
an epiphenomenon, .  .  .  it is causally potent.”65  This means that a pure physical or 
physiological explanation can never give the whole picture.  As Birch argues, “we can 
probably find mechanistic analysis for all joints in a pole vault.  We could perhaps also find 
all neuronal events in the brain, and all forces working on the body, ground and pole.  But is 
this identical to how it feels to do a six-meter jump? The suggestion is ‘no’ and the reason is 
that the reference between the angles, the neuronal events and my feeling of what’s it like 
does not refer both ways.”66 
Furthermore, Breivik argues that not only the conscious awareness during a 
competition but also the conscious planning before the competition is often overlooked in 
phenomenological analyses of sport.  Athletes spend a lot of time making plans, preparing, 
evaluating alternatives, going through things in their minds before competitions, elaborating 
on strategies, etc.  All this includes knowledge of different kinds. 
 
Neuroscience and Mirror Neurons 
The neurosciences have developed fast and have generated new knowledge about how 
the brain works.  What is called the easy problem is related to the brain location of 
consciousness states.  The hard problem is related to how the subjective conscious experience 
of something (qualia) is related to the neurophysiology of the “the soggy grey matter” that is 
called the brain.  The gap between the neurophysiological description of the working brain 
and the correlated subjective experience of a specific person defines what is called “the 
explanatory gap.”  Philosophers and neuroscientists are still far away from an explanation of 
this gap.  Some philosophers, like Colin McGinn, think that our brains may not be wired in 
such a way that we can bridge this gap.67 
Neurophysiological research has, however, opened interesting new vistas for sport 
philosophers.  Imitation and copying are important ways of learning skills.  
Neurophysiological studies have shown that imitation is founded in our brains at a much 
deeper level than we thought.  Giacomo Rizzolatti and co-workers have found that the brains 
of monkeys and humans respond directly to motor actions performed by other agents.68  
When I see a person lifting her hand to her mouth to eat, I respond not only with a visual 
response, but a motor response that is a copy of the original one.  My brain fires at the same 
location as the brain of the other person.  The response is somehow not carried through but 
the motor neurons in the brain fire as if I lifted my own hand to my mouth.  This means that 
we have an immediate motor understanding of what other agents do.  And, furthermore, it 
seems that it is the intentional character of the action that is important.  I know immediately 
what the action is about and respond with the relevant intentional pattern (lift the hand to eat).  
So knowledge is related to intentions of other people in an immediate sensory-motor copying 
pattern.  As Birch and others conclude, this new insight has consequences for our 
understanding of basic skills in sports like copying, imitation, and taking the perspective of 
others.69 
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Conclusion 
Sporting knowledge is of many kinds.  I have tried to give an overview of quite 
different forms of knowledge and I have used different approaches that are not easily 
combined to a coherent whole.  What is unique to sport is the form of knowledge we call 
know how.  Aristotle was aware of techne, the technical and practical knowledge needed in 
painting, sculpturing, and manual work.  But Greek philosophers and philosophy in modern 
times were mostly occupied with discussions of theoretical knowledge.  In recent philosophy, 
the seminal distinction made by Ryle between knowing how and knowing that led to a 
discussion of various forms of practical knowledge.  The discussion of the relation between 
know how and know that is alive and is unresolved.  Intellectualists maintain that know how 
is a form of or is dependent on know that.  Most philosophers lean in the anti-intellectualist 
direction and think that these are two distinct and different forms of knowledge. 
In addition to this discussion, the distinction between personal knowledge and 
objective knowledge made by Polanyi became important.  Polanyi also underlined the tacit 
dimension.  Most of the personal knowledge is tacit or implicit.  Dreyfus had views similar to 
Polanyi but he came from another tradition, building his work on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
and phenomenology.  Dreyfus also underlined the immediate, direct, non-representational 
form of dealing with the environment.  Absorbed skillful coping became a standing 
expression for expertise in daily life and in sport.  Also from Dreyfus’s viewpoint, knowledge 
in sport is non-conscious.  In contrast to these views, Breivik, Birch, and others have 
maintained that not only the psychological machinery working on automatic pilot plays a role 
in sport but also the conscious experience of qualia. Phenomenal consciousness thus adds 
something to our experiences in sport and thereby makes a specific contribution to sporting 
knowledge. With the introduction of the neurosciences and the new knowledge of mirror 
neurons, new dimensions of immediate knowledge of other persons, their intentions, and 
actions, are opened up.  Maybe the understanding, especially of team sports, will be deeply 
changed by such new discoveries. 
We saw in the beginning of this chapter that scientific knowledge has become 
important in sport.  Since the 1970s, sports sciences have had an increasing impact on how 
sports, both at mass and elite level are practiced.  The development of sport scientific 
paradigms, the organization and focus of sports sciences will be important in the coming 
years, since new practitioner roles and new professions of a sports-related nature are 
spreading rapidly.  The same is true of the global dissemination of new forms of physical 
activity, which have cultural ramifications.  At the heart of sporting knowledge, however, lies 
the unique experience each of us has when after mastering a new skill we exclaim “Yes!  I 
know how to do this!” 
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